REMUNERATION SYSTEM

FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF DEUTSCHE EUROSHOP AG

Publication in accordance with section 120a (2) of the Aktiengesetz (AktG - German Stock Corporation Act).

The Annual General Meeting of Deutsche EuroShop AG on 18 June 2021 confirmed the remuneration system for the Executive Board with 93.45%.

The wording of the resolution is derived from agenda item 6 and from the description of the remuneration system for the Executive Board of the convening notice and agenda of the Annual General Meeting of Deutsche EuroShop AG on 18 June 2021 published in the Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) on 6 May 2021.

The proposed resolution and the description of the remuneration system are reproduced in full below.

DESCRIPTION OF THE REMUNERATION SYSTEM FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

1. Legal basis of the remuneration of the members of the Supervisory Board

Principles of the remuneration system
Deutsche EuroShop AG (hereinafter "DES") is the only joint stock company in Germany to invest solely in shopping centers in prime locations. The strategy pursued by DES focuses on investments in high-quality shopping centers in city centers and established locations offering the potential for stable, long-term value growth.

A key objective is to generate high surplus liquidity from leases in shopping centers, which can be paid out to shareholders in the form of an annual dividend. To this end, the Company invests its capital in shopping centers in different European regions in accordance with the principle of risk diversification. Germany is the main focus of investment. Indexed and turnover-linked commercial rents form the basis to achieve the high earnings targets. In addition, new investments must be funded from a balanced mix of sources.

Climate protection is another top priority for DES. The aim is to combine sustainability and profitability as well as shopping experience and environmental awareness.

The remuneration system of the DES Executive Board supports this strategy in a balanced way and serves as an important control to achieve the core corporate objectives. Within this context, the structure of the remuneration system for the DES Executive Board is based on the following principles:

- Strategy-compliant and performance-based consideration of key figures relevant to corporate governance as well as individual performance targets
- Integration of the topic of sustainability and climate protection through the inclusion of criteria from environmental, social and governance (ESG)
- Focus on sustainable corporate development in order to align actions with the long-term and consistent success of DES
- Compliance with regulatory requirements and consideration of current market practice
- Ensuring that the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders are aligned with those of the DES Executive Board

The remuneration system for the Executive Board developed on this basis meets the regulatory requirements of the German Public Companies Act (AKtG) and also complies with the recommendations of the Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (DCGK – German Corporate Governance Code). The performance targets defined by the remuneration system set incentives for successful and sustainable corporate growth and link the remuneration of the Executive Board to the long-term successful development of the Company.

The components of the remuneration system are explained in detail below. Subject to approval by the Annual General Meeting, this remuneration system applies to all Executive Board employment contracts that are extended or newly concluded.

Procedure for establishing, implementing and reviewing the remuneration system
Pursuant to § 87a (1) AktG, the Supervisory Board of DES determines a remuneration system for the Executive Board, which is submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval pursuant to § 120a (1) AktG.

This remuneration system was adopted by the Supervisory Board at its meeting on 9 April 2021. It will be submitted for approval at the Annual General Meeting on 18 June 2021.

If, in the course of the ongoing review of the remuneration system, material changes are made to the remuneration system, it must be resubmitted to the Annual General Meeting; even if no material changes are made to the remuneration system, such resubmission is required at least every four years after the last vote on the remuneration system by the Annual General Meeting.

In the event that the Annual General Meeting does not approve the remuneration system, the Supervisory Board must submit a revised remuneration system to the next Annual General Meeting for approval in accordance with section 120a (3) AktG.

The regulations outlined in the German Public Companies Act (AktG) and the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) on the handling of conflicts of interest in the case of members of the Supervisory Board are observed both during the process of establishing and implementing the remuneration system and as part of its ongoing review. If conflicts of interest exist, the members of the Supervisory Board concerned must disclose these to the Chair of the Supervisory Board and abstain from voting on the relevant matters. In addition, the Chair of the Supervisory Board reports to the DES Annual General Meeting on any conflicts of interest that have arisen and how they have been dealt with. If the conflicts of interest are material and not merely temporary, they must lead to a termination of the Supervisory Board mandate.

Determination of the specific target total remuneration. Suitability test

The Supervisory Board sets a target total remuneration for the members of the Executive Board. In doing so, it ensures that this remuneration is proportionate for the duties and performance of the respective member of the Executive Board as well as the situation of the Company and does not exceed the customary remuneration without special reasons. In addition, the target total remuneration must be geared towards the long-term and sustainable development of the Company.

To ensure a suitable level of remuneration, the remuneration levels of the members of the DES Executive Board are compared with the remuneration levels customary in the market using a suitable peer group (horizontal comparison). The Supervisory Board furthermore takes into account the Company's internal remuneration ratios when determining remuneration levels by comparing the remuneration of the Executive Board with the remuneration of the general workforce (vertical comparison). This also takes into account the remuneration trends of the aforementioned employee groups over time.

If the Supervisory Board enlists the services of an external remuneration expert to develop the remuneration system and assess the appropriateness of the defined remuneration, it must ensure that the expert is independent of the Executive Board and of the Company.

Overview of the remuneration system

Components of the remuneration system

The following overview shows the basic components of the remuneration system and their structure:

Fixed (non-performance-related) components	
Annual remuneration	• Fixed basic annual remuneration, paid monthly in twelve equal instalments
Ancillary benefits	• Car for business and private use • Accident insurance / D&O insurance • Subsidy for health insurance and long-term care insurance
Company pension scheme	• Defined contribution plan in the form of an annual fixed amount paid into a pension fund • Alternative: taking out a retirement insurance policy for pension benefits
Variable (performance-related) components	
Short-Term Incentive (STI)	
Plan type	• Annual target bonus plan
Cap	• 150 % of target amount
Performance targets	• Financial performance target: - Funds from operations (FFO) per share • Personal criteria-based multiplier (0.8 – 1.2): - 50 % ESG target (e.g. certification of centers) - 25 % personal target (e.g. capital market communication rating) - 25 % individual special projects / strategy implementation
Payment	• Due in cash upon approval of the annual financial statements
Long-Term Incentive (LTI)	
Plan type	• Performance cash plan (annual rolling)
Cap	• 150 % of target amount
Performance targets	• Total shareholder return (TSR; 75 %): - 2/3 absolute TSR - 1/3 relative TSR compared to relevant competitors • Loan to value (LTV; 25 %): - Absolute LTV - Multiplier depending on relative LTV (0.8 – 1.2)
Performance period	• Four years
Payment	• Due in cash upon approval of the annual financial statements for the last financial year of the respective tranche

Other contractual arrangements

Maximum remuneration per Executive Board member	• €1,100,000 p. a.
Share Ownership Guidelines	• Obligation to acquire and hold shares in Deutsche EuroShop AG amounting to at least 100 % of gross annual basic remuneration • Obligation to hold shares for the entire period of service and for two years thereafter • Build up over one third of the STI and 100 % of the LTI payout amount
Clawback	• Possibility of reclaiming variable remuneration (STI as well as LTI) in certain cases
Severance cap	• Limited to two years' remuneration (basic annual remuneration plus contributions to the company pension scheme, STI and LTI), but no longer than the remaining term of the employment contract

Relative shares of the remuneration components in the target total remuneration

The target total remuneration of the members of the Executive Board is defined as the sum of the annual basic remuneration, ancillary benefits, company pension scheme as well as STI and LTI (in each case assuming 100 % target achievement). The basic annual remuneration corresponds to between 40 – 50 % of the total target remuneration. The STI accounts for around 20 – 25 % and the LTI for around 25 – 30 % of the target total remuneration. The company pension scheme accounts for around 5 % and ancillary benefits for around 2 – 4 % of the target total remuneration.

The significant share of the variable remuneration components in the target total remuneration and the higher weight of the LTI compared with the STI underline the "pay for performance" approach and the alignment of the remuneration towards the long-term and sustainable success of DES.

Maximum remuneration of the Executive Board

The variable remuneration components of the Executive Board (STI and LTI) are subject to an individual cap of 150 % of the target amount in each case. In addition to this individual cap, the Supervisory Board has set a maximum level of remuneration in accordance with section 87a (1) sentence 2 no. 1 of the German Public Companies Act (AktG). The amount of the maximum remuneration per Executive Board member for each financial year is €1,100,000. This maximum remuneration additionally limits the payouts of all remuneration components granted for a financial year (basic annual remuneration, ancillary benefits, company pension scheme as well as STI and LTI), irrespective of when they are paid out.

Components of the remuneration system in detail

(A) Fixed (non-performance-related) components

1.1 Annual basis remuneration

The members of the Executive Board receive a fixed basic annual salary for their work, which is paid in twelve equal monthly instalments and is based on the duties of the respective Executive Board member.

1.2 Ancillary benefits

In addition to the basic annual remuneration, the fixed remuneration components include further ancillary benefits for the members of the Executive Board. These essentially include a car for business and private use as well as accident insurance. The members of the Executive Board also receive an allowance for health and long-term care insurance amounting to 50 % of the amounts payable by them, but not exceeding 50 % of the contributions to statutory health and long-term care insurance. In addition, a standard D&O insurance policy is taken out for the members of the Executive Board.

1.3 Company pension scheme

The members of the Executive Board receive a company pension in the form of a defined contribution plan. Under this plan, the Company pays a fixed amount each year into a support fund or other pension investment vehicle (e. g. unit-linked investments). Alternatively, the Company may take out a retirement insurance policy on behalf of the Executive Board member for pension benefits.

The following provisions from previous contracts continue to apply: Under an existing employment contract, an Executive Board member has a fixed entitlement to benefits under the company pension scheme granted in previous years even if their appointment as an Executive Board member ends before the age of 62, unless the Executive Board member has not accepted an offer to extend their appointment on comparable terms. Furthermore, this entitlement ceases at the end of the year in which the Executive Board member becomes incapacitated for work or dies ("grandfather clause").

(B) Variable (performance-related) components

In addition to the non-performance-related components, the members of the Executive Board are granted performance-related remuneration components on an annual basis. These ensure that the Executive Board is remunerated in line with its performance and underline the Company's commitment to the "pay for performance" approach. The variable components are divided into the one-year short-term incentive (STI) and the four-year long-term incentive (LTI). The division into STI and LTI streamlines the focus on DES's long-term and sustainable development while pursuing its annual operational targets. The variable components thus underpin successful implementation of the corporate strategy.

2.1 Short-Term Incentive (STI)

The STI is designed in the form of a target bonus system that promotes the successful implementation of the corporate strategy through targeted incentives. For this purpose, alongside a main control parameter of DES – funds from operations (FFO), consideration is given to the personal strategic goals for the individual members of the Executive Board as well as to sustainability goals from the areas of environment, social and governance (ESG). The payout amount is calculated by multiplying the STI target amount agreed in the Executive Board member's employment contract by the level of target achievement of the financial performance target FFO per share. Subsequently, the non-financial performance targets are taken into account by means of a criteria-based multiplier. The STI payout amount can assume a value between 0 % and a maximum of 150 % of the STI target amount. Any possible STI payment is due upon approval of the annual financial statements.

The main features of the STI are as follows:



a. Funds from operations (FFO) per share

FFO is included in STI target achievement in the form of the financial performance target FFO per share, which can reach a possible target achievement of 0 % to a maximum of 150 %. FFO are used to finance ongoing investments in portfolio properties, scheduled repayments on long-term bank loans and as the distribution of dividends. Significant non-recurring effects that are not part of the Group's operating activities are eliminated in the calculation of FFO. FFO is therefore the key indicator for assessing the performance of the operating business and, in the form of FFO per share, is an important indicator for external valuation of the Company. The inclusion of FFO per share in the STI supports the corporate strategy by incentivising the sustained stable performance of the shopping centers and the generation of a high liquidity surplus from their leasing. Since FFO per share is also a strong indicator of future dividend payments, the interests of shareholders are likewise taken into account in the remuneration of the Executive Board.

At the beginning of each financial year, a target value for FFO per share is set in line with capital market communication, whereby target achievement is set at 100 %. This target value corresponds to the value for FFO per share specified in budget planning for the respective financial year. For each 1 % deviation from the respective budget value, the target achievement is reduced or increased by 1.5 percentage points. From a deviation in FFO per share of minus 25 % compared with the budget value, target achievement is 0 %. In addition, if FFO per share is plus 33.33 % versus budget, target achievement is capped at 150 %. If this upper limit is reached, a further increase in FFO per share will not result in a further increase in target achievement.

b. Criteria-based multiplier

In addition to the financial performance target of FFO per share, the final payout amount of the STI is influenced by personal targets and ESG targets. These are taken into account in the form of a criteria-based multiplier, which can have a value of 0.8 to 1.2. The value of the criteria-based multiplier is the sum of the achieved factors of three performance targets, each multiplied by their weighting.

As an investment company with hardly any staff of its own, sustainable real estate is a core objective of DES. The external and independent certification of the centers (e. g. by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Nachhaltiges Bauen e.V. (DGNB – German Sustainable Building Council, DGNB) or a comparable organisation) is therefore taken into account as a sustainability goal. The DBNG issues certificates in platinum, gold, silver or bronze to certified centers upon qualification. These certificates attest to greater sustainability in the operation of real estate. A factor is assigned to each certificate. Platinum receives the factor 1.2, gold 1.0, silver 0.9 and bronze 0.8. If no certificate is issued or no certification is performed for a center, the value is 0. A weighted average is calculated over the entire DES portfolio using these factors. This weighted average can assume a value of 0.8 to 1.2 and is factored with a weighting of 50 % when determining the value of the criteria-based multiplier.

For example, an external and independent capital market communication rating in the "Real Estate Europe" sector can be used as a personal strategic target for the members of the Executive Board. Depending on the rank of DES within this rating, a factor of 1.2 is produced for positioning in the upper third, 1.0 in the middle third and 0.8 in the lower third. The respective factor is assigned a weighting of 25 % in the criteria-based multiplier. This performance target underlines the importance of excellent capital market communication for successful implementation of the corporate strategy.

As the final personal performance target, individual special projects or the contribution made to implementing the strategy of the Executive Board members are also included in calculation of the criteria-based multiplier with a weighting of 25 %. These can take the form of funding transactions as targets for the Chief Financial Officer, or mergers & acquisitions and restructuring projects as targets for the CEO, for example. This provides an incentive for the successful implementation of key projects and strategy components relevant for the Company's success and focuses on the individual, role-specific performance of the respective Executive Board member. If the Supervisory Board rates the performance within the special project as very good, this equates to a factor of 1.2. A good performance rating results in a factor of 1.0, while a below-average performance is rated with a factor of 0.8.

The actual target achievement per performance target of the STI as well as the value of the criteria-based multiplier are disclosed ex post in the remuneration report after conclusion of the respective financial year.

2.2 Long-Term Incentive (LTI)

The LTI takes the form of a performance cash plan with a performance period of four years. When selecting the performance targets for the LTI, special focus is placed on the long-term and stable performance of DES. The LTI is granted on a rolling basis, meaning that at the beginning of each financial year a target LTI is proposed for each Executive Board member, which is stipulated in their employment contract. This rolling allocation additionally promotes sustainable behaviour as the results from one financial year are relevant for several LTI tranches. Depending on predefined performance targets, the overall target achievement for each LTI tranche at the end of the four-year performance period determines the final LTI payout amount. Alongside internal key figures, the performance targets also take into account relative performance compared with competitors. The LTI payout amount can assume a value between 0 % and a maximum of 150 % of the LTI target amount. A potential LTI payout is due upon approval of the annual financial statements for the last financial year of the respective tranche.

The LTI payout amount is dependent on two financial performance targets, which are considered both in relative and absolute terms. These are, on the one hand, the total shareholder return (TSR) with a weighting of 75 % and, on the other, the loan to value (LTV) with a weighting of 25 %.

The main features of the LTI are as follows:



a. Total shareholder return (TSR)

The TSR, which is weighted at 75 %, is considered in two ways. Two-thirds of the TSR success target depends on absolute TSR. The remaining third is determined by the relative TSR compared with relevant competitors. This ensures an adequate shareholder return in both absolute and relative terms.

The absolute TSR denotes the total shareholder return from the change in the share price over the performance period under consideration plus notionally reinvested gross dividends. In order to avoid distortions due to e. g. reporting date effects, the absolute TSR is calculated on the basis of the average closing prices of DES in the month before the beginning and before the end of the respective performance period, plus the notionally reinvested gross dividend during this period.

The target value for achieving 100 % corresponds to an absolute TSR of 24 %. In addition, a lower limit is set where target achievement is 0 %. This case occurs at an absolute TSR of 0 %. The upper limit is set at an absolute TSR of 36 %, with target achievement of 150 %. An increase in the absolute TSR beyond 36 % does not result in a further increase in achievement of the target. The degree of target achievement is interpolated on a linear basis between the specified target achievement points (0 %/100 %/150 %).

The relative TSR compares the TSR with a peer group of relevant competitors. The peer group currently consists of the following companies: Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield SE, Compagnie Foncière Klépierre, Atrium European Real Estate Limited, Citycon Oyj, Eurocommercial Properties N.V., Mercialys SA and Wereldhave N.V. The Supervisory Board has the option of removing individual companies from the peer group before the start of a new tranche. The prerequisite for this is that the respective company no longer exists in its current form or that comparability with DES is no longer given. There is also the possibility of adding new, suitable companies.

To determine target achievement, the average TSR of the peer group is first determined as described (with all peer companies weighted equally). This is subtracted from the TSR of DES to obtain the outperformance in percentage points. The outperformance value describes the relative TSR. If this calculation results in outperformance of 0 percentage points (i.e. the average TSR of the peer group has performed identically to the TSR of DES over the performance period), this corresponds to target achievement of 100 %. With a relative TSR of minus 20 percentage points, target achievement is 0 %. The maximum target achievement corresponds to 150 % and is reached beginning from a relative TSR of plus 20 percentage points. The degree of target achievement is interpolated on a linear basis between the specified target achievement points (0 % / 100 % / 150 %).

b. Loan to value (LTV)

In addition to the TSR, the LTV of the DES Group is factored into the LTI with a weighting of 25 %. The LTV describes the ratio of net financial liabilities (financial liabilities less cash and cash equivalents) to non-current assets (investment properties and financial investments accounted for using the equity method, excluding goodwill). It is therefore a key indicator for assessing DES's creditworthiness and is also an important criteria for approving financing.

To determine target achievement, the average LTV of the DES Group over four years is calculated on the basis of the Group's LTV values reported in the respective annual financial statements for the relevant financial years. If the average LTV is greater than 55 %, this corresponds to target achievement of 0 %. If the average LTV is greater than 45 % but less than or equal to 55 %, target achievement is 50 %. The target value and thus target achievement of 100 % is reached with an LTV greater than or equal to 35 % but less than 45 %. Below an LTV of 35 %, target achievement is 150 %. A further reduction in the LTV does not result in an increase in target achievement above 150 %.

In addition to its absolute consideration, the LTV is also compared with the equivalent and equally weighted average LTV of the peer group described above over the performance period and is factored into the process of determining the LTI payout amount with the aid of a multiplier. If the comparison reveals that the LTV of the peer group is more than 1 % lower than that of the DES Group, a multiplier of 0.8 is applied to the target achievement resulting from absolute consideration of the LTV. For positive deviations of 1 % or less, the multiplier is 1.0. The multiplier is 1.2 in the event that the LTV of the peer group is more than 1 % higher than that of the DES Group. Irrespective of this, the multiplier cannot increase target achievement of the absolute LTV to more than 150 %.

Any adjustments to the composition of the peer group and the reasons for this adjustment, the actual target achievement per LTI performance target and the value of the multiplier are disclosed ex post in the remuneration report after the end of the performance period.

(C) Clawback

In certain cases, the Supervisory Board has the option of reclaiming all or part of the variable remuneration paid to the Executive Board members (STI and LTI). The prerequisite for this is an intentional breach of material duties punishable by a penalty or a fine, or a serious breach of other material duties of the executive body. In addition, the Company or one of its affiliated companies must have incurred a significant financial disadvantage as a result.

A claim for repayment exists in the amount of the net inflow after income taxes paid and lapses after expiry of a period of three years after the variable remuneration component is granted or after the Executive Board member leaves the Executive Board, whichever is earlier.

(D) Share Ownership Guidelines (SOG)

The employment contracts of the members of the Executive Board also contain obligations pertaining to purchasing and holding shares, known as Share Ownership Guidelines (SOG). These require each member of the Executive Board to buy and hold DES shares worth 100 % of their respective gross annual basic remuneration (SOG target). Until this SOG target is reached, Executive Board members must invest one third of their STI payment amount and 100 % of their LTI payment amount (in each case, after income tax) in Deutsche EuroShop AG shares within a period of three months of receipt. In the case of insider trading, the Supervisory Board has the option of extending this three-month acquisition period. Shares already directly held by the Executive Board member are factored into achievement of the SOG target. The shares must be held for the entire period of service and for another two years after leaving the Executive Board.

The SOG regulations described above further align the interests of the Executive Board with those of shareholders while at the same time incentivising the long-term and sustainable development of DES.

Remuneration-related legal transactions

- *Contract terms and termination options*

  The employment contracts of the members of the Executive Board have a fixed term of up to five years. In the case of initial appointments, the contract period is a maximum of three years.

  Neither party has the ordinary right to terminate employment contracts. This does not affect the right to terminate the employment contract for good cause pursuant to section 626 (1) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB – German Civil Code).

- *Provisions in the event of premature termination of the employment contract*

  In the event that the employment contract is terminated prematurely by the Company without good cause for which the Executive Board member is responsible as defined by section 84 (3) AktG, the Executive Board member is entitled to a gross severance payment in the amount of two years' remuneration. The annual remuneration comprises the basic annual salary and contributions to the company pension scheme as well as to the STI and LTI. For measurement of the annual remuneration amount, the average annual remuneration for the financial year just ended and the probable annual remuneration for the current financial year is applicable. If the remaining remuneration to which the Executive Board member is entitled until the scheduled end of the employment contract amounts to less than two years' remuneration, the severance payment entitlement is reduced accordingly, meaning that the severance payment only provides compensation for the remaining term of the employment contract.

  In all other cases of premature termination of the employment contract, there is no entitlement to a severance payment.

  If the employment contract is terminated at the instigation of the Company without good cause for which the Executive Board member is responsible as defined by section 84 (3) AktG, any components of variable remuneration that have already been granted will be paid out in accordance with the scheduled payment conditions.

  In the event that the employment contract is terminated prematurely by the Company for good cause for which the Executive Board member is responsible as defined by section 84 (3) AktG, all components of variable remuneration that have already been granted but not yet paid must be forfeited.

  The previous regulations regarding the company pension scheme of a member of the Executive Board remain exempt from these regulations.

- *Temporary and permanent incapacity for work and death*

  In the event of temporary incapacity for work, all remuneration components must be paid pro rata temporis for a period of six months, but no longer than until termination of the employment contract.

  If the Executive Board member becomes permanently incapacitated for work during the term of the employment contract, the employment contract must end at the close of the quarter during which the permanent incapacity for work was established. In this case, the remuneration components for the financial year in question are reduced pro rata temporis up to the departure date. Any downstream payments attributable to previous years from current tranches or from previous periods are disbursed immediately based on the assumption that overall target achievement of the variable remuneration components is 100 %. The contributions to the company pension scheme must continue to be paid until the end of the year in which the Executive Board member became permanently incapacitated for work.

In the event of death, the same regulations apply as in the case of permanent incapacity for work. However, the employment contract ends at the end of the month in which death occurred. All payment claims arising from the employment contract are heritable.

- *Regulations in the event of entry or exit during the year*
  If the Executive Board member's activity begins or ends during the current financial year, the basic annual remuneration, the variable remuneration and the annual contribution to the company pension scheme are granted pro rata temporis. The variable remuneration components are paid out in accordance with the scheduled payment conditions.

- *Internal Supervisory Board mandates*
  Any remuneration received by a member of the Executive Board for assuming internal Supervisory Board mandates or comparable mandates from affiliated companies is offset against the Executive Board remuneration.

Temporary deviation from the remuneration system
Pursuant to § 87a (2) sentence 2 AktG, the Supervisory Board of DES may temporarily deviate from the remuneration system insofar as this is necessary in the interests of the long-term prosperity of DES.

Such deviations may be necessary, for example, to ensure adequate incentives in the event of a serious corporate crisis (e. g. destruction of a center), force majeure or economic crisis (e. g. COVID-19 crisis). A temporary deviation of this kind is possible only in exceptional circumstances. Generally unfavourable market developments do not count as exceptional circumstances justifying a temporary deviation from the remuneration system. The circumstances necessitating the deviation are determined by resolution of the Supervisory Board.

Irrespective of a possible temporary deviation from the remuneration system, the Supervisory Board ensures that the remuneration of the Executive Board continues to be aligned to the long-term and sustainable development of DES. In addition, the Supervisory Board oversees that the remuneration of the Executive Board is commensurate with the situation of DES and the performance of the respective Executive Board member.

After determining the exceptional circumstances by resolution of the Supervisory Board, the Supervisory Board may make deviations from the remuneration structure, the performance targets of variable remuneration and the individual remuneration components of the remuneration system applicable to the Executive Board.

In the event of a temporary deviation, the circumstances necessitating the deviation and the procedure for the deviation are explained in the remuneration report in accordance with section 162 (1) no. 5 AktG, and the remuneration components affected by the deviation are specified.